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APPELLEE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The University Hospital, pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, hereby petitions this Court for a rehearing,
based on the following reasons and grounds.
ARGUMENT
The plurality opinion of this Court is both complex and
diverse.

The four separate opinions written by members of the

Court reveal that little was agreed upon by the members of this
Court.

After a careful analysis of the separate opinions

appellees believe it fair to state that the following decisions
were made:
1. The $100,000 statutory cap provision of the prior
governmental immunity statutes (S§ 62-30-29 & 34) was held
unconstitutional as it applies specifically to the
University Hospital.
2. Section 63-30-4, which provides that employees of
governmental entities may not be held personally liable for
acts or omissions within the course and scope of their
employment, unless due to fraud or malice, is not
unconstitutional as applied to employees of the University
of Utah School of Medicine or the University Hospital.
3. Two members of the Court believe that a substantive
due process analysis should be made regarding statutes
limiting recovery rights, one member believes that an
intermediate equal protection standard should be applied,
and two members believe a rational basis equal protection
standard should be applied.
Assuming that appellees1 interpretation of the opinion is
correct, it can be stated that this opinion per se does not
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affect the present statutory scheme in which a $250,000 maximum
has been imposed nor does it affect governmental entities other
than the University Hospital, either health care providers or
non-health care providers.

As a practical matter, however, this

decision will have a substantial impact upon future application
by the trial courts of the Governmental Immunity Act and its
present damage cap, applicable to all governmental entities and
particularly the University of Utah School of Medicine and the
University Hospital.
Because of these important ramifications this decision must
be viewed as more than merely a resolution of a conflict between
the plaintiffs and defendants in the instant case.

It

establishes important principles and procedures which no doubt
will be applied in many cases involving numerous other plaintiffs
and defendants in a host of governmental liability disputes.
POINT I
A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED TO ALLOW
APPELLEES THE OPPORTUNITY OF ADDRESSING THE
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS STANDARD ADOPTED BY
TWO MEMBERS OF THIS COURT.
A review of the lower court proceedings on Appellants1
motion for partial summary judgment reveals that the question of
substantive due process was never argued by either party or
decided by the lower court.

Similarly, the briefs to this Court

did not address this standard.

Indeed, the Berry decision, upon

which this standard is purportedly based was not decided until
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

after appellees1 brief was filed.

No request was made by this

Court to file supplemental briefs during the three-year period
this case was being decided.
Likewise, the open court provision was not relied upon by
appellants in the proceedings below nor on this appeal.

While it

was urged that this constitutional provision was a right
deserving the highest equal protection standard it was never
claimed or argued that this provision should be a basis of
invalidating the recovery limit statutes.
All Justices acknowledge that due process was not argued
below or before this Court.

Justices Durham and Zimmerman excuse

this irregularity by claiming that equal protection and
substantive due process are nearly the identical standards.

See,

e.g., Slip Opinion, pp. 15 (J. Durham); pp. 35 (J. Zimmerman
concurring).

On the other hand Justice Stewart argues that these

standards are different and are designed for separate analyses.
Slip Opinion, p. 39 (J. Stewart concurring).

Finally, Justices

Hall and Howe argue that the standards are separate and
traditional concepts of judicial review have been violated by
considering these issues on appeal.

Slip Opinion, pp. 53-54, (J.

Hall and J. Howe, dissenting).
Appellees believe there are fundamental reasons why a due
process analysis cannot be applied in this case.

However, it

would be a waste of resources for appellees to brief this issue
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unless the Court will allow the input of the parties.

Appellee

contends that this Court's failure to follow appropriate judicial
review procedures, by deciding this case based on a
constitutional provision and standards not relied upon by
appellants, and therefore not briefed or argued by appellees,
violates its rights to due process of law under the United States
and Utah Constitutions.

This Court has decided an extremely

important issue based upon a state constitutional provision
(Article I, Sec. 11), and an analytical standard (due process as
opposed to equal protection) which were not briefed or argued by
the parties.

Appellees had no reason or right to brief or argue

those issues because they were not raised by appellants.
Appellees have been deprived of the right to be heard on critical
issues upon which this Court1s ruling is based.
This serious error should be corrected by allowing briefs
and argument on these issues.
524, 532 (Wis. ct. App. 1980).

Cf. Yotvat v. Roth, 290 N.W.2d
It is, therefore, respectfully

requested by the University Hospital that a rehearing be granted
on this most important question of limitation on state government
liability.
POINT II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD AMEND
ITS OPINION AND REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING AND DETERMINATION BY THE TRIAL COURT
BASED ON THE NEWLY FORMULATED STANDARD.
If this Court declines to allow appellees the opportunity to
4
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argue the legal standards that should be applied, it should, at a
minimum, allow appellees the opportunity of having an evidentiary
hearing in the lower court.

A remand is essential because of the

following:
1. This case originated as an interlocutory appeal
from the denial of a motion for partial summary judgment,
where no attempt was made to adduce substantive evidence.
2. The new standard formulated by a plurality of this
Court has shifted the burden of proof thereby mandating a
new hearing in which the burden can be correctly applied.
In the proceedings below a motion for partial summary
judgment was made by the plaintiffs.

No attempt was made by

either party to extensively examine the factual basis upon which
the $100,000 cap was legislated.

In fact, the major controversy

below and in this Court was the standard which should be used in
judging the constitutionality of the statutes.

No effort was

made by either party to develop empirical evidence of any
magnitude concerning the validity of the statute because the
magnitude of the evidence required was directly dependent upon
the standard adopted.
The lower court, following then existing law, apparently
applied the rational basis standard.

In fact, this Court prior

to Berry had never applied even a "heightened" standard under
equal protection analysis, but had relied exclusively on a
rational basis standard in cases not involving suspect
classifications or fundamental rights.

As such, the burden of

5
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proof was upon the plaintiffs :i n the 1 ower court to show the
statute f
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The burden of proving a constitutional violation must
be sustained as a demonstrable reality and not as a matter
of speculation, and is not sustained by generalities.
Accordingly, the party having the burden of proving
invalidity must do so clearly or beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, he must negative every conceivable or reasonable
basis which might support the statute, or prove the absence
of any conceivable grounds on which the statute may be
supported.
*

*

*

The party attacking the statute has the burden of
establishing the invalidating facts on which his claim is
based, of showing that the legislative findings of fact are
without rational basis, or that the stated facts on the
existence of which a statute is predicated does not exist.
16 C.J.S. §104, Constitutional Law, pp. 344-48 (footnotes to
citations omitted).
Thus

v.-s approach and as noted by Justice Hall in

the dissenting opinion the burden of overcoming the presumption
nt ronstituf innaJjfy
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must "prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable
doubt. !f

11 • • Opinion, p
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i the clear burden placed upon the plaintiffs in

the lower court, the various opinions written in this case
repeatedly state that the appellees ti -i n. I ail - ,3 t i nupei their
burden of proof in th*- lower court and before this Court,

A few

examples of thili s required burden are as follows:
By means of (1) extending immunity to employees of all
government-owned health care facilities and (2) imposing a
blanket cap on all recoveries, the legislature has sought to
respond to what the University Hospital and the Attorney
General in his amicus brief describes as a "financial
crisis" in state liability and liability insurance. No
6
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factual information regarding the alleged crisis has been
cited to this Court, either from the legislative history of
the Act, the evidentiary record in the court below, or
reliable sources of which this Court could legitimately take
judicial notice. Indeed, most of the Attorney General's
sources are newspaper articles from other states, and the
majority of them deal with municipal, rather than state,
liability problems. The state asks this Court to engage in
the kind of speculation about legislative rational
associated with the "any conceivable rational basis test."
However, because of the constitutional status of the right
to a remedy for damages to one's person under Article I,
§11, more is required. (Slip Opinion, pp. 18-19, Justice
Durham opinion). (Emphasis added).
The recovery limitation in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act on all damages caused by government-owned
health care providers and their employees is such an
unreasonable burden. There is no factual showing in the
legislative history or the trial court that the recovery
limitation is reasonably necessary for preservation of the
public treasury. It is true, of course, there will be less
cost to the state and insurance will be more readily
obtainable if the state does not have to respond in damages
in excess of $100,000 for injuries caused by its health care
entities and employees or insure against those damages.
However, before the state is permitted to conserve those
monies at the expense of seriously injured citizens, its
citizens are entitled to a showing in the courts that a
measure so drastic and arbitrary as a $100,000 cap on all
damages is urgently and overwhelmingly necessary. (Slip
Opinion, p. 28, Justice Durham opinion). (Emphasis added).
* * *

[T]he burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of
the statute shifts to its proponents. The supporters of the
legislation have not carried their burden. The
justifications advanced for the legislatures having abridged
the important right of citizens to recover even out-ofpocket losses occasioned by injuries to their persons is a
narrow category of circumstances for the benefit of a narrow
category of defendants are extraordinarily weak. In fact,
at oral argument both the Attorney General and the lawyer
for the hospital and physicians involved admitted that they
had no empirical evidence that damage awards in Utah have
threatened the stability of any unit of government and that
the concerns that led to the legislation were based on
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anecdotal evidence.
Zimmerman opinion)

(slip Opinion, pp. 37038, Justice
(Emphasis added).

[TJhere is no basis for concluding that according
patients at the University Hospital a full remedy for tort
liability will threat the financial stability of government
or of the hospital, or even result in an undue drain on
resources. While there will be some additional expenditures
incurred by the hospital's liability for full damages, there
is no reason to believe that that cost cannot be recovered
as present liabilities. . . . Neither the hospital nor the
Attorney General in this case even begins to demonstrate
that requiring the hospital to shoulder the full cost of
liability will have a substantial effect on the state's
treasury. There is no evidence that in Utah personal
judgments are unduly large or that they have increased
greatly in their number. Indeed, since the government bears
only a fraction of the total cost of the operation of the
entity, it is clear that the vast bulk of the activity ;:
self-financed by fees and charges. (Slip Opinion, ^ 4
Justice Stewart opinion). (Emphasis added).
The sep'di' t\ te op ,1 in J ons ot 1 he cour t haspci upon substantive
due process and an intermediate standard - r equal protection have
elevated the standard of review
*--

* constitutionality and shifted t .1 :ie burden c >f proof

trie state ~ p:\-vt - ;.•• validity of the statute.
r\ i e v x e
.lowing:

•

si' a i"» i'" e s 11! 1:1 i i s i • d s i" b I! \ i n w >, t lie

The lowe: ^ u ; adopted the rational basis test as

the correct standard thereby placing the burden upon the
plaintiffs tn ^iinu that th<: ley i * i .-H ion ,i > q u e s t i o n c o u l d « o * b e
supported under that standard.

The defendants made no effort to

create a record proving the legislative reasons
t '"''r t tie ,-it at: \i 11:' beiLrtusi;' 11 wat not required

n«M If, l« at K M "

oi :i appeal, however,
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this Court adopted a new standard which was not argued below.

In

deciding that the recovery limitations statutes are
unconstitutional three Justices of this Court based their
decision on the failure of the State to produce any evidence
showing the reasonableness or necessity of the recovery
limitation statutes.

Because the state made no effort during the

lower court proceedings and minimal effort on appeal to produce
evidence justifying the statutes, there is naturally not a record
in this case which could satisfy the new heightened standard now
applied by this Court.
In effect, therefore, appellees have been denied due process
of law.

They have not been given the opportunity to produce

evidence supporting the validity of these statutes and have been
found to be deficient in their quantum of proof even though the
lower court proceedings did not require such proof to be
introduced.

Not only did the University Hospital not have the

opportunity to argue the formulation of this new standard but it
does not, unless this decision is remanded, have the opportunity
to present evidence in accordance with new standard.
It is not only fundamentally unfair to the University
Hospital in this case to be denied an opportunity to meet the
standard now created by a plurality of this Court but is also
against all judicial rules of appellate procedure to prohibit a
party from presenting evidence in accordance with the new
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POINT
BECAUSE A P P E L L E E S JUSTIFIABLY RELIED UPON THE
RECOVERY LIMITATION STATUTES, THIS DECISION
SHOULD BE APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY ONLY
The recovery limitation provision w<is t
Legislature I |4n'i

emained unchallenged until -^e

instant case more than twenty years later.

This Court in i960

specifically held that the University Host •-a

pei for med a

governmental I urn lion lot purposes of determining applicability '
of the Governmental Immunity Act

Frank v. State, 613 p.: d si 7

(Utah 1980).
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I

In fact, in reliance on the recovery limitations statutes,
the Hospital set its fees charged to patients, established its
reserves for liability claims, funded its malpractice defense
trust, and decided not to purchase insurance.

In essence the

Hospital's entire risk management system has been established in
reliance on the recovery limitation statutes and prior opinions
of this Court.

It is impossible to "pass on" this increased

liability exposure of pending cases to patients who have long
since departed from the University Hospital.

It is also

impossible to purchase insurance for pending claims.
"Constitutional law neither requires nor prohibits
retroactive operation of an overruling decision."

Loyal Order of

Moose No. 259 v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257,. 264 (Utah 1982).

A

court in its discretion may prohibit retroactive operation of an
overruling decision where retroactive operation creates a burden
or where the overruled law has been justifiably relied upon.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance, 493 P.2d
1002 (Utah 1972).
This Court in Loyal Order of Moose No. 259, supra, refused
to apply a decision striking down a rule regarding an
organization's exemption for tax purposes because of its
charitable activities.

This Court said:

We believe the circumstances of this case require that
the rules adopted in this decision be applied prospectively
with a delayed effective date. The holding in the 1975
B.O.P.E. case has been the law upon which many organizations
have operated and upon which tax exemptions have been
11
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granted or denied. Further, the step in the direction of
that case was first taken in the Groesbeck case in 1911.
Without warning it would be inequitable to correct an
interpretation of law that has been relied upon for so many
years. Also, if the rule were to be given retroactive
effect, the assessment of back taxes on properties affected
by this rule might well result in an unreasonable burden
upon all those organizations and governmental bodies
associated with it. By staying the effective date of our
ruling in this case, not only are court and agency resources
saved, but time also is allowed for organizations affected
to make needed adjustments. 657 P.2d at 265.
See also Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v.
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah
1984); Rio Algo Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah
1984) .
Similarly, in Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709
P.2d 265 (Utah 1985), this Court held:
The circumstances of this decision are very similar to
those in Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d 257, which gave rise
to that case's holding respecting its effective date. The
defendants here have relied for many years on a statutory
interpretation of a constitutional provision, and this
opinion resolves a difficult question of first impression.
Because of the substantial delay entailed in the litigation
process, retroactive application requiring the assessment of
back taxes might well result in an unreasonable burden on
the defendants in this case and on other similarly situated
entities. Substantial changes in their operating budgets,
record-keeping, and admission policies may result from our
holding. It may be that adjustments in accounting practices
and other policies will enable these defendants and other
hospitals to qualify in the future for the constitutional
exemption. In order to avoid the unreasonable burden that
might otherwise be placed on them, we hold that the ruling
of this case shall be applied prospectively only with an
effective date of January 1, 1986.
Id. at 279.
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«

These principles are equally applicable in the present case.

(

It would be inequitable and would place an unreasonable burden on
the University Hospital to suddenly remove the limitation cap as
to those cases arising during the time period it was in effect.
Thus, the decision rendered by this Court should be applied
prospectively only.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of May, 1989.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

B y T w ^ r - UJ<J4*^__
MeTIin R.'Lybbert
David G. Williams
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing
Appellee University Hospital's Petition for Rehearing upon the
following counsel of record:
M. David Eckersley
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Appellants
175 East 400 South, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this 30th day of May, 1989, by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
to said counsel.

Attorneys for Petitioner
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